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This article examines the impact of the Ottoman tradition in the Balkan states in 
the 19th and 20th c. The character of the political leadership and the centralized re-
gimes established in the Balkan states was despotic, autocratic and authoritarian, 
as a result of the absence of democratic tradition and an underdeveloped political 
awareness and culture. A characteristic feature of the Turkish system was the posi-
tion of the relatively free peasants, very different from the position of peasants in 
Europe. The features characteristic of the Ottoman tradition which survived in 
the Balkans the longest, until the end of the 20th century, were violence, corrup-
tion, nepotism as an intrinsic component of political life and power often chang-
ing hands, because of violence, assassinations, murders, etc.
Key words: Ottomans, Balkan states, political culture, political regime, vio-
lence, bureaucracy, corruption, social and economic order
It is not an easy task to ascertain the influence of the Ottoman tradition upon the cul-
ture and model of power in the Balkan states. The complexity of the problem and the 
fact that the Balkan nations, no longer Turkish dominance in the 19th century, tried 
to overthrow the formal Ottoman legacy as soon as possible and to negate, if not even 
annihilate, the informal one, makes drawing decisive conclusions risky. The birth of 
the independent Balkan nations coincided with attempted political reforms in Turkey. 
Moreover, there is an undeniable connection between the liberating of the Balkan na-
tions from the Turkish dominance and the crisis of the Ottoman Empire and efforts 
to reform it. However, the Balkan states tried – with varying results – to implement 
modern European political systems. The position of great European powers was an 
important factor. Their support of the Balkan nations’ irredentist aspirations and the 
fact that the small Balkan elites were foreign-educated made European powers obvious 
models of political systems worthy of implementing. Nevertheless, the mentality and 
especially the tradition of the Balkan nations and their leaders were imprinted with 
*1 Research presented in this article was financed by the grant of the Polish National Science Center 
UMO-2011/03/B/HS3/01453.
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the Ottoman Empire’s model and culture of power. This paper is concerned with the 
reception of the Ottoman legacy concerning the culture (and the model) of power in 
the independent Balkan states after the emerged, and taking into consideration the 
often blurred and ambiguous forms in which the Ottoman influence manifested itself, 
modified by the urge to break free of the ‘legacy of enslavement’. The paper is a pioneer-
ing attempt at a comprehensive and complementary analysis of the reception of the 
Ottoman culture of power in the revived Balkan states in the 19th and 20th century. 
The Ottoman legacy in general has been a subject of study, but this paper undertakes 
a more specific and focused task of studying the influence of the Ottoman model of 
the culture of power from a comparative perspective comprising three nations: Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece1.
What I mean here by the culture of power is the conglomerate of elements of the 
Ottoman civilization and culture making up the political model and practice through-
out the Ottoman Empire but particularly in the Balkans2. The power of Ottoman 
sultans possessed peculiar characteristics combining an efficient but parasitic political 
regime with a certain form of despotic rule, peculiar practices of recruiting state elites 
(from among slaves), and disdain towards the Empire’s Christian population (reaya)3. 
The focus of this paper is more on the Ottoman influence upon the culture of power in 
the Balkan states than on particular systemic solutions which might have derived from 
the Ottoman tradition. 
Maria Todorova is right to observe that differences between the Balkan nations 
contradict the existence of a singular Ottoman legacy, but there were certain nuclei of 
‘continuance’ present already after the secession of the Balkan states4. Consequently, 
one should avoid generalizations and remember about inter-regional diversity. Ques-
tions arise concerning both the continued Ottoman legacy and its rejection after 
the emergence of the national states in the Balkans. Todorova points to the hybrid 
1 The multifarious influence of the centuries of Turkish presence in the Balkans on the life of the Bal-
kan people has been the subject of numerous publications, includings: W. S. Vucinich, The Ottoman 
Empire. Its Record and Legacy, Princeton, New Jersey 1965; W.S. Vucinich, ‘The Nature of Balkan So-
ciety under Ottoman Rule’, Slavic Review 1963/4 Vol. XXI; Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman Imprint 
on the Balkans and The Middle East, C. Brown ed. , New York 1996; M. Todorova, Imagining the 
Balkans, Oxford 1997; E. Boyar, Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: empire lost, relations altered, Lon-
don-New York 2007; See also: H. İnalcık, The Middle East and the Balkans under the Otoman Empire. 
Essays on Economy and Society, Boolmington 1993; V. Freidman, From Orientalism to Democracy and 
Back Again. Turkish in the Balkans and in Balkan Languages (in:) Developing Culture Identity in the 
Balkans. Convergence vs. Divergence, R. Deterez, P. Plas ed., Brussels 2005; The Ottomans and the 
Balkans. A Discussion of Historiography, F. Adanir, S. Faroqhi ed., Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002. Other 
relevant references are quoted in the text.
2 See J.C. Goldfarb, Reinventing Political Culture: The Power of Culture versus the Culture of Power, 
Polity Press 2011, Part 2, passim.
3 The term was limited to non-Muslim subjects from the times of Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640). S.J. 
Shaw, The Ottoman view of the Balkans, (in:) The Balkans in Transition. Essays on the Development of 
Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century, C. & B. Jelavich, Hamden ed. 1974, p. 66.
4 M. Todorova, The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans (in:) Imperial Legacy, p. 53.
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model of the culture of power, the result of the fusion of the Ottoman and vernacular 
traditions5.
While addressing the problem of the Ottoman legacy regarding the model and cul-
ture of power and the political practice in the Balkan states, one should concentrate on 
these aspects which can be defined as a continuum, although of varying duration, and 
can reflect a lasting tradition transmitted across centuries by already existing systems. 
It must be emphasized that simple copying of the Ottoman system could have occurred 
within one or maximum two consecutive generations after the overthrow of the Ot-
toman rule. Over time, the images and situations fixed in generational memory have 
gradually faded, losing its relevance to younger generations. However, we must keep in 
mind that the memory of Ottoman rule was preserved and perpetuated for subsequent 
generations as part of the oral history.6 According to Wayne Vucinich ‘the Ottoman 
legacy in the contemporary Balkans is many-sided and its roots are deep and ramified’7.
Thus, the social climate in the Balkans was likely to conserve a system of govern-
ment and culture of power similar to the Ottoman model of which the majority of the 
Balkan population in respective states had no direct experience. The Ottoman legacy 
continued to affect the developments in the liberated Balkan states for some time, but 
these processes did not unfold concurrently in all the Balkan nations.
A characteristic feature of the Ottoman system was the position of relatively free 
peasants, very different from the position of peasants in Western Europe. It may be 
identified as part of the Ottoman legacy as it had resulted from the policy of the Otto-
man rulers implemented as early as the 14th century and continued over the following 
centuries. According to the Islamic law and practice, the conquered land taken from 
the ‘unfaithful’ remained the property of the state, better yet, of the sultan himself, 
thus secured for its peasant users8. In this way, the Ottoman Empire protected the 
peasants against the grandees9. Having conquered the Balkans, the Ottomans had 
retained the extant agrarian system and thus the actual situation of peasants changed 
little,10 since the time-honored tradition obliged the sultan to treat his subjects ‘with 
kindness and justice.’11 Likewise Prince Miloš Obrenović upheld the principle of the 
peasants’ ownership of the land after he had ascended the throne.12 So forth, the peas-
5 Ibidem, p. 56-57.
6 J. Strauss, Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered: Remarks on Some Local Greek Chronicles of the 
Turkokratia (in:) The Ottomans and The Balkans, p. 210-211.
7 W.S. Vucinich, Some Aspects of the Ottoman Legacy (in:) The Balkans in Transition, Essays, p. 85.
8 J. Haldon, The Ottoman State and the Question of the Autonomy. Comparative perspectives (in:) New 
Approaches to State and Peastant in Ottoman History, H. Berktay, S. Faroqhi ed., London 1992, p. 57.
9 H. İnalcık, The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, p. 144.
10 M. Marinković, The Shaping of the Modern Serbian Nation and of Its State under the Ottoman Rule 
(in:) Disrupting and Reshaping Early Stage of Nation-Building in the Balkans, M. Dogo, G. Franzi-
netti ed., Ravenna 2002, p. 38.
11 P. F. Sugar, Southern Europe under Ottoman Rule 1354-1804, Seattle-London 1977, p. 33.
12 M. Ekмечић, Стварание Југославие 1790-1918, t. 1, Београд 1989, p. 222. G. G. Arnakis, The Near 
East in modern times. Vol. 1. The Ottoman Empire nad the Balkan States to 1900, Austin-New York 
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ants retained the important role they had had before the Ottoman rule. Ascertaining 
this may seem outrageous but the similarities are important, the key factor being the 
position of the ruler and the so-called ruling class. Some argue that the Ottomans had 
created an ideal absolute monarchy by annihilating the class of local landowners and 
creating and maintaining the court elite instead13. In the Ottoman state, the ruling 
elite was the product of the Islamic law and the sultans’ policy. Two arguments often 
addressed in studies concerning the Ottoman system have to be considered: 1) the state 
did not protect and promote the stable, traditional Ottoman nobility and as a result 
there was no traditional ruling elite; 2) the absence of traditional land ownership com-
bined with an elevated position of slaves in the state administration, many of whom 
were drafted through the devşirme14, meant that there existed no aristocracy to act as 
an intermediary between the peasants and the state personified by the sultan. Through 
its tax collectors, the state obtained the necessary agrarian products directly from the 
farmers: they were the producers, they fed the nation, they were important and indis-
pensable and not the aristocratic landowners15. In its specific way, the Ottoman Empire 
was egalitarian as there was only the class of relatively free peasants and the state elite 
recruited from the traditional but politically insignificant nobility and slaves promoted 
by the sultan. The slaves played a very significant role in the Ottoman state. The only 
group situated between the peasants and the sultan were the so-called askeri, who were 
primarily military officers16. This specific egalitarianism of the Ottoman period be-
came the foundation of social order in the Balkan states. In fact, the first ruler of the 
Principality of Serbia Prince Miloš in fact preserved and transmitted the Ottoman 
system. Despite Vuk Karadžić’s persuasion, he did not consent to the creation of a new 
gentry and he protected small peasant farms17.
In the Balkan states, the peasants were the ‘salt of the earth’, they were the stake-
holders of the state and political parties. Consequently, the public authority took from 
the sultan the principal attitude towards the largest social group18. In this respect, there 
was a fundamental difference between the Balkans and Western or Central Europe. 
To the political forces in Serbia and Bulgaria, the peasants became not only the target 
of political propaganda, but also the point of reference regarding the reforms which 
were supposed to be implemented. As required by the rules of democracy, the political 
1969, p. 238.
13 H. İnalcık, Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case (in:) Imperial Legacy, p. 20.
14 P. F. Sugar, op. cit., p. 57.
15 His widely accepted view is question by some researchers, for example J. Haldon, op. cit., p. 54.
16 Alongside the soldiers who constituted the largest group, the askeri category also comprised beauro-
crats and clergy: all those who were exempt from taxation. Ibidem, p. 55.
17 M. Ekмечић, Стварание Југославие, p. 220. С. Јовановић, Друга влада Милоша и Михаила, 
Београд 1933, p. 462
18 М. Перишић, ‘Град и грађанин у Србији крајем 19. bека’, Историјски записи LXXI, 1998/3-
4, p. 115. In the late 19th century, Serbian authorities did not allow for the consolidation of land 
ownership and protected small peasant farms.
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authority had to adjust its policies to the peasants as the largest electorate but, ironi-
cally, the peasants’ attitudes were formed by a deeply rooted hostility towards change 
– and change – which was the Ottoman legacy. For centuries, the Ottoman state had 
not changed, neither in Anatolia not in the Balkans19. Its Balkan subjects had come 
to believe that this permanency is satisfactory and advantageous, something of a per-
fect equilibrium. In the Balkan states, the politicians tried to win the peasants’ sup-
port arguing that their traditional values, by virtue of being traditional, were in no 
way inferior to modern systems and solutions in other European countries. One could 
remain traditional and deeply conservative without losing vitality or strength. Quite 
the contrary – they reasoned – remaining faithful to the conservative values made the 
people less ‘sinful’ than other nations, simply morally better20. A specific set of mind 
developed which was formed by the fear of change. Aleksa Ratac, one of the leaders of 
the Radical Party, declared at a session of the Serbian Skupština (Diet) in 1903: ‘There 
are many among us who can read and write. While there were few literate people in 
the country, Christ walked on our land, but now that there are more of them, we have 
been cursed’21. 
The emergence of first ideas of modernization came about with the return of young 
elites from their studies abroad, the Serbian prečani educated in Vienna or Paris and 
Bulgarian alumni of Russian universities, but it did not significantly change public at-
titudes. Quite the contrary, it helped create a deep divide between the narrow educated 
elites and illiterate rural masses22. It hardly seems surprising since the rural societies 
in the Balkans regarded the conservative, patriarchal and collectivist egalitarianism 
as the fundamental social and political value. In 1910, Jovan B. Jovanovič wrote in 
the Nedelni pregled weekly that „Serbia is a democratic nation free of any social, eco-
nomic or religious conflicts”23. This concept of social order was rooted in tradition and 
policies of the Ottoman authority which had guaranteed collective rights of the millets 
and had not been concerned with the rights of individuals. Hence, in the process of 
emergence and development of modern Balkan states, the focus was on the national 
community rather than on civil and individual rights24.
19 The Ottomans did not know any other form of state and were convinced that even the smallest chan-
ges present a threat to the state and socjety. P. F. Sugar, op. cit., p. 34.
20 Ћ. Станковић, Сто говора Николе Пашића. Вештина говориштва државника, књига 1, Београд 
2007, p. 102-103.
21 O. Popović-Obradović, Kakva ili kolika država. Ogledi o političkoj i društvenoj istoriji Srbije XIX i XX 
veka, Beograd 2008, p. 330.
22 D. Stojanović, Recepcija ideala slobode, jednakosti i bratsva, (in:) Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima 
19. i 20 veka. 3. Uloga elita, ed. L. Perović, Beograd 2003, p. 91-92.
23 Ibidem, p. 84.
24 Б. Стеваноић, Политичка култура и културни идентитети у Србији и на Балкану, Ниш 2008, 
p. 221. O. Popović-Obradović, op. cit., p. 324. D. Stojanović, Recepcija, p.77.
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According to Maria Todorova, it can be argued that the existence of the free peas-
antry as an Ottoman legacy saved the Balkans from the so-called second serfdom25. The 
Ottoman social legacy, that is the existence of the de facto free peasantry, the weakness 
of the bourgeoisie and absence of the aristocracy within a centralized state, had doubt-
lessly provided important components of the socio-political order of the independent 
Balkan states as they emerged.
One cannot ignore Kemal Karpat’s views regarding the character of the Ottoman 
state. According to Karpat ‘the Ottoman philosophy of government, society, and the 
individual was natured by way of Anatolia through the rich heritage of Islam which 
had produced a new civilization in the Middle East from a synthesis of its own teach-
ings with ancient Greek rationalist philosophy, Roman administrative practices, and 
Sassanid theories of social and political organization’26. However, the most prominent 
element of the continuum and the one most often addressed by scholars is the charac-
ter of the centralized regimes established in the Balkan states defined as sultanism, 
autocracy, and authoritarianism. While the Ottoman culture of power was not the 
sole reason responsible for the development of such regimes, it is certain that such fac-
tors rooted in the Ottoman legacy, such as the lack of any tradition of representation, 
underdeveloped political culture and the absence of the press as an opinion-forming 
instrument of public control coincided with and contributed to their rise in the unedu-
cated Balkan societies as a form of copying the Ottoman culture of power.
The peasantry, being the dominating social class in the Balkan states, it determined 
the actions of the public authority. Political leaders holding on to power had to con-
sider their interests and use suitable (comprehensible) forms of propaganda. Obviously, 
the forms of propaganda and particular goals were diverse and reflected local condi-
tions. To Serbia’s first ruler Prince Miloš Obrenović, the peasants were both the stake-
holders and victims of his policies. He did not know any system of government but the 
Ottoman and was ready to resort to any means to establish a similar system in Serbia27. 
Serbia’s political system evolved slowly but the power of Prince Miloš was modeled 
after ‘Ottoman rule without the Turks’28. One of his early Serbian biographers ascer-
tains that Prince Miloš patterned his despotism after the Turks. Clerks in his chancel-
lery had the title of ‘servants to the prince’ and he would not hesitate to have them 
flogged or even killed if they had failed him29. Cruel and ruthless towards his subjects, 
he treated them in the Ottoman manner and rarely did his conduct depart from that of 
25 M. Todorova, The Ottoman Legacy, p. 60.
26 K.H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History. Selected Articels and Essays, Lieden-Bo-
ston-Köln 2002, p. 387.
27 M. Marinković, op. cit., p. 43.
28 M. Palairet, Rural Serbia Reshaped and Retarded 1739-1914, (in:) Disrupting and Reshaping, p. 80.
29 В. Дворниковић, Карактерологија Југословена, Bеоград 1939, p. 861-862; Numerous examples of 
Prince Miloš’s cruelty are given by J.M. Продановић, Уставни развитак и уставне борбе у Србији, 
Београд 1936, p. 36-37.
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an ‘Oriental despot’ or ‘little sultan’30. Prince Miloš mimicked the sultan in dress and 
manners and he even had something of a harem31. On the one hand, he tried to picture 
himself as the defendant of peasants, and on the other he overtaxed them and followed 
in the footsteps of sultans by regarding the tax income as his personal income. His 
methods of procuring money were ruthless32. He had no scruples about confiscating 
anything of value, whether gold ducats or landestates, which had in time made him the 
biggest landowner in Serbia33. His biggest political opponent, Toma Vučić Perisić, was 
not much different. He had an equally bad attitude, he was demagogue, hot-tempered 
intriguer, liar, bloodsucker, and robber so the overall picture of the political leadership 
of the early period of Serbian statehood was rather bleak34. Prince Mihailo Obrenović, 
the son and successor of Prince Miloš, likewise concentrated power in his hands by 
creating the so-called ‘bureaucratic despotism’ and eradicating any independence of 
state officials left over from the preceding rule of the ustavobranitelji (‘The Constitu-
tionalists’) and certain characteristic features of the system continued well into the 20th 
century35. According to Slobodan Jovanović, Princes Miloš and Mihailo represented 
the same type of absolute ruler embodying the state in their persons36.
Many regard the regime of the ustavobranitelji as equally authoritarian, oligarchic, 
and ‘oriental’, with power concentrated in the hands of a small exclusive group of offi-
cials who ‘manage’ the people but neither for the people nor in their name. Some regard 
their ingenuity in torturing their opponents as exceeding the Ottoman standards37. 
Several decades later, King Milan Obrenović and his son Alexander I followed a simi-
lar path squandering the incomes of the Serbian treasury to cover their own expenses 
without any regard for public needs and the source of income. Contemporary observers 
were also critical of the long rule of King Nicolas I Petrović of Montenegro which like-
wise was not subject to any public control. British diplomat Henry Beaumont recalled 
with disdain the extensive expenditures related to the celebrations of King Nicolas I of 
Montenegro Fiftieth Jubilee (50th anniversary of his rule) in 1910. The beautification 
of Montenegro’s capital Cetinje cost more than the state’s yearly spending on educa-
tion38. In the attitude of Paris-educated King Nicolas I of Montenegro, formed by the 
fusion of atavism and modernism, Vladimir Dvorniković sees a man of two cultures.39 
30 С. Јовановић, op. cit., p. 462-466.
31 K.H. Karpat, op. cit., p. 462.
32 В. Стојанчевић, Милош Обреновић и његово доба, Београд 1966, p. 397; P. Pavlovich, The Serbians: 
the Story of a People, Toronto 1988, p. 126.
33 P. Pavlovich, The Serbians, p. 126.
34 В. Дворниковић, Карактерологија Југословена, p. 875-876.
35 С. Јовановић, op. cit., p. 467-468.
36 Ibidem, p. 461.
37 L. Despotović, Srpska politička moderna. Srbija u procesima političke modernizacije 19. veka, Novi Sad 
2008, p. 61.
38 E. Roberts, Real of the Black Mountain. A History of Montenegro, London 2007, p. 278.
39 В. Дворниковић, Карактерологија Југословена, p. 888-889. M. Z. Zorić, Kralj Nikola Petrović Nje-
goš. Mladost i prve godine vlade, Cetinje 1935, p. 4-5. Vojvoda Simo Perović, Memoari, Podgroica-
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But, according to the commander of Montenegro’s army, the king’s very important 
trait was his unswerving optimism.40 The first decades of independent Greece brought 
the authoritarian regimes, with President Ioannis Kapodistras (1927-1931) and King 
Othon I (1832-1862).
The question arises whether the Serbian, Bulgarian or Greek elites were at all capa-
ble of introducing new solutions for political systems they had been familiar with and 
a new culture of power to the people (peasants) who had only known the repressive 
Ottoman rule and the fragile equilibrium of everyday relations between the sultan’s 
Christian subjects and representatives of the Ottoman administration. Without a 
doubt, the Balkan nations’ perception of the state and authority had been burdened 
with the experience of the Ottoman rule. Firstly, to the societies living in a very tradi-
tional structure, the very concept of state was abstract as they only had an experience 
of the organized authority of Ottoman functionaries, usually tax collectors, enforced 
by the Ottoman gendarmerie. The trauma of excessive tax burden and frequent bru-
tal repressions had become deeply embedded in the peasants’ collective consciousness 
and injustice became associated with the very concept of authority: in the languages 
of southern Slavs the term for the state connotes power and force rather than some 
superior territorial structure. The peasant life in the Balkans was marked by the hero-
ism of enslavement, pain, and dying41. Notably, the state of mind of the Balkan peo-
ples conquered by the Ottomans had been formed by the centuries-long experience of 
haplessness. Vucinich points out that it was underlain by the central notion of kismet 
(‘twist of fate’), and the lack of faith in any possibility of changing one’s situation, 
reducing social attitudes to bare struggle for survival, especially in tumultuous times 
and so dangerous a place as the Balkans. The state of mind dominated by the instinct 
of self-preservation encouraged passivity among the locals whose attitudes towards 
the Ottoman authorities oscillated between subjection and cunning42. In the 1930s, 
Dvorniković, an authority on the sociology and anthropology of southern Slavs, wrote 
about the de-slavonization and cultural orientalization of the masses in the Balkans as 
a legacy of the centuries-long captivity. He observed that the vital forces of the long-
suffering Balkan peoples were rooted in their experience of poverty and deprivation43. 
At the same time, Jovan Cvijić points to the emergence of the ‘oriental moral type’ 
formed under the influence of the centuries-long Turkish rule and manifested through 
numerous imitations of ‘pashas’ and ‘beys’ in public life.44 This element of the culture 
of power may be found in the attitudes of many people active in politics in the subse-
quent decades of the 20th century. 
Cetinje 1995, p. 508.
40 Vojvoda Gavrilo Vukotić, Memoari, Cetinje 1996, p. 703.
41 V. Dvorniković, Psiha jugoslovenske melanholije, Zagreb 1925, p. 34.
42 W.S. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire. Its Record and Legacy, p. 120-121.
43 В. Дворниковић, Карактерологија Југословена, p. 310.
44 J. Cvijić, Balkansko Poluostrov i južnoslovenske zemlje. Osnove antropogeografije, Beograd 2011, p. 122.
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Thus, the peasants were poor, passive, disobedient, and suspicious towards the 
state, this hostility was fed by the permanent fear of the security of one’s meager exist-
ence, with low productivity inspiring resistance to any public levies as threatening to 
deepen the inherited poverty. The memory of Ottoman abuses deeply imprinted in the 
mentality of the Balkan people prevented them from overcoming indifference towards 
their national state – Serbian, Bulgarian or Greek45 – since they did not perceive it as 
fundamentally different from the Ottoman regime.
The character of Ottoman rule, its actions centered on collecting taxes and invent-
ing still new levies which paralyzed the people’s natural economic activity, became a 
heavy burden upon the economic development of the Balkan states. Observers of the 
Balkan reality pointed to passivity as a distinctive characteristic of local economies and 
emphasized the reluctance of local people to expand beyond familiar and repetitive 
labors performed to maintain the minimum level of subsistence. ‘Work is somewhat 
alien to our man. He regards it as torture and pain, as humiliation (...), as the death of 
virility and heroism’ – wrote Dvorniković46. There was no reason to work more or work 
harder when any fruits of one’s labor were taken away by the Ottoman authorities in 
any case.
The Ottoman state was parasitic and the principal manifestation of its economic 
activity was collecting taxes which kept increasing thus discouraging any entrepreneur-
ship47. The peasants’ indifference towards modern farming technologies corresponded 
to their attitudes centered on preserving and petrifying the extant traditional way of 
life as ensuring an acceptable equilibrium between the necessity to make a living for 
oneself and one’s family and the awareness that any surplus would be taken away by 
ruthless and dishonest tax collectors. There was no reason to strive to improve produc-
tivity48, especially considering the progressive taxation aimed at the more affluent and 
presumably more productive individuals. Archibald Reiss observes that the peasants 
had gotten used to work as little as possible. Since the fruits of their labor would be 
taken away from them anyway, they had seen no reason to make their oppressors richer. 
This had led to the cult of simple life and tradition. . Even after the liberation from the 
Ottoman domination, the peasants of Serbia, Bulgaria or Greece would feel obliged by 
‘tradition’ to reject modern rational farming improvements49.
However, in the collective memory the recollection of oppression, violence and en-
slavement coexist with the appreciation of the stability of life under the Pax Ottomana. 
45 In Greece, as late as the 1920s tere were no legal rules obliging bureaucrats to follow instructions of 
state authorities. T. Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics. From Independence to Democracy, London 
1977, p. 213-215.
46 B. Despot, Filozofiranje Vladimira Dvornikovicia, Zagreb 1975, p. 126.
47 S.J. Shaw, The Ottoman view on the Balkans, p. 60-61.
48 В. Дворниковић, Карактерологија Југословена, p. 326.
49 A. Рајс [Archibald Reiss], Чујте Сирби! Чувајте се себе, Београд 2008, p. 17-20. Swiss Archibald 
Reiss was a professor of criminology, he arrived in Serbia before World War I and later trained Serbian 
police officers. He died in Belgrade in 1929.
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The future showed the independent Balkan nations were reluctant to quickly change 
the way of life developed in the Ottoman times. Thus, the negative image of the Ot-
toman heritage might have been a myth developed later.50 According to Sia Anagnost-
opoulou ‘in Greek national historiography the Ottoman era has been regarded as a 
period of tyranny and slavery for Greek nation’51.
As compared to the rest of Europe, the effect of processes of ‘long duration’ upon 
the Balkan nations was exceptionally strong. It was a consequence of the centuries of 
stagnation and resultant conservatism of respective societies. Many attempts to im-
plement new systemic political, economic or social solutions undertaken by state au-
thorities encountered the peasants’ resistance but the most typical attitude was that of 
watchful obstruction. It was characteristic of communities which had been powerless 
in the face of change and deprived of any influence upon the conduct and actions of 
the authority. Understandably, the kind of passivity that had for centuries determined 
social attitudes, imprinted not only by life under the hostile political regime but also 
reflecting the perceived permanence of social relations and living conditions. This pas-
sivity could not be quickly transformed into activity or at least some interest in what 
was happening around. Antoni Todorov points to the low level of politicization of Bul-
garian society after 1878. The ‘political slumber’ inherited from the Ottoman times 
lasted until World War I52. Skepticism and watchful waiting seemed the most common 
attitudes towards the new state authorities reflecting the transmission of the people’s 
perception and reception of the Ottoman state system into the new political reality of 
national states. 
The new state systems in the Balkans emerged among convulsions amplified on the 
one hand by the desire to annihilate any external signs of the bygone Ottoman rule and 
to mark some ‘new beginning’ and on the other by the apparent inability to eradicate 
various manifestations of the Ottoman legacy. The establishing of new forms of politi-
cal power was realized through the copying and adaptation of European models which 
were incongruent with the mentality of the political leaders of the early period still 
rooted in the traditional Ottoman culture of power. They treated their people not very 
differently from the Ottomans and the people, atavistically afraid of the authority and 
accustomed to being the object rather than the subject of the state’s policies, allowed 
for this state of domination and alienation of power to continue and petrify. Peasant 
50 S. Milošević, Arrested development: mythical characteristics in the ‘five hundred years of Turkish yoke’ 
(in:) Images of Imperial Legacy. Modern discourses on the social and cultural impact of Ottoman and 
Habsburg rule in Southeast Europe, ed. T. Sindbaek, M. Hartmuth, Berlin 2011, s. 73. The author 
analyzes Serbian textbooks published in the 20th century in which the image of the Ottoman period 
is unequivocally negative.
51 S. Anagnostopoulou, ‘Tyranny’ and ‘Despotism’ as National and Historical Terms in Greek Historio-
graphy (in:) Clio in the Balkans. The Politics of History Education, C. Koulouri ed., Thessaloniki 2002, 
p. 81.
52 A. Toдopoв, Граждани, партии, избори: България 1879-2009, София 2010, p. 70.
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revolts occurred but they were acts of despair rather than acts of faith in the possibility 
of revolutionary change. 
The bureaucratic nature of the Ottoman culture of power was its most character-
istic feature which found continuance in public life in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. 
The bureaucratic state elite in the Ottoman Empire was interested in maintaining 
the system which guaranteed them power and profits. Its primary task was to procure 
incomes for the treasury by collecting the existing taxes as well as inventing and im-
posing new levies. Located far away from the capital beyond the effective control of 
the central authority, Bosnia and Herzegovina was especially vulnerable to this fiscal 
practice, more than any other province of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1st half of the 
19th century, local peasants were burdened with about 150 (sic!) various taxes, levies, 
and fees. This had led to blatant abuses and enforcing additional tributes, for example 
in order to cover the cost of collecting taxes53. The bureaucracy of the Balkan states was 
based on the Ottoman experience which led to widespread corruption and sanctioned 
bribes (baksheesh) becoming a mere fact of life, an element of everyday reality54. One’s 
obligations towards the state and its bureaucracy became indistinguishable and were 
executed as one. Regarding the baksheesh as an element of normal exchange between 
themselves and the sultan’s subjects, Ottoman bureaucrats had employed a degree of 
privatization of their official function typical of and specific to the Ottoman system. 
As a time-honored tradition, the custom of presenting and accepting ‘gifts’ for per-
forming acts, which was in modernized states regarded as work routinely performed 
for the common good, had seemed natural. Some schollars argue that corruption is a 
direct heritage of the Ottoman occupation of Greece because the Greek word rousfeti 
derives from Turkish rüşvet (bribe).55
Kemal Karpat is right to assess that in the 19th century in the minds of the Balkan 
people the image of the sultan as head of an oppressive bureaucratic regime became 
fixed56 and the new political reality brought little change in this area. The bureaucracy 
had access to the tax money and continued the practice of ‘privatizing’ tax incomes. 
The first major corruption scandal in Serbia was related to the construction of the 
Beograd-Niš-Vranje railway in the 1880s57. Archibald Reiss writes about the wide-
spread practice of stealing tax money and abuses committed by Serbian bureaucrats 
and ministers during World War I (and later) pointing in this context to the Ottoman 
proclivity for corruption58. Corruption became a serious problem also in the reinstated 
53 Д. Берић, Устанак у Херцеговини 1852-1862, Београд 1994, p. 78-79.
54 W.S. Vucinich, Some Aspects of the Ottoman Legacy (in:) The Balkans in Transition, p. 89.
55 G.A. Kourveratis, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics. East European Monografhies No. 
DXXXIV, New York 1999, p. 253. C. Tsoucalas, On the Problem of Political Clientelism in Greece in 
the Nineteenth Century, „Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora”, vol. V, No. 1 Spring 1978, p. 8.
56 K.H. Karpat, op. cit., p. 401.
57 Н. Вучо, Развој индустрије у Србији у XIX веку, Београд 1981, p. 128.
58 A. Rajc, op. cit., p. 37-41.
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Bulgarian state59. The Balkan societies’ preference for statism, which prevented compe-
tition and income inequalities, was at the same time conducive to the demoralization 
of the bureaucracy as the class of people who privatized taxes and had uncontrolled 
access to the tax money60.
The Ottoman culture of power also comprised a certain style and model of execu-
tion of power which, in sharp contrast to European nations, remained unchanged for 
centuries, suspended in some interval between the organization of the nomads who 
had settled in the Balkans after the conquest and the structures of modern, efficient 
state. Even in the 19th century, it seemed anachronistic.
Kemal Karpat points to the dichotomy between the state and society that had ex-
isted in the Islamic world from the beginning and over time developed into a rift divid-
ing the two sides61. Does this also apply to the Balkan states? In Bulgaria, Serbia and 
Greece, what kind of a relationship was developed between the ruling bureaucracies 
and respective societies, poor and uneducated as they were? Dubravka Stojanović iden-
tifies a model of development in her opinion characteristic of all Balkan states in which 
three spheres functioned separately, practically almost independently of one another: 
the sphere of power, the sphere of various forms of civic society, and the society itself62. 
This kind of situation unfolded in Bulgaria where social development was realized in 
opposition to the state authority. There, the attitude of hostility and passivity towards 
the state seemed so embedded that it let some Bulgarian political scientists formulate 
the thesis of the essentially ‘apolitical’ character of the Bulgarian people63. This situa-
tion occasionally motivated Bulgarian leaders to resort to revolutionary means in order 
to overcome inertia and accelerate the processes of modernization (Stefan Stambolov) 
or, quite the opposite, to cultivate tradition (Nikola Pašić). The political elites of the 
Balkan nations faced an unwanted dilemma: to serve the people and govern in their 
name or to carry on operating and wait for them to embrace the idea of the connection 
between the people and the state.
The feature characteristic of the Ottoman culture of power which survived in the 
Balkans the longest, until the end of the 20th century, was violence as an intrinsic com-
ponent of political life and power often changing hands as a result of violence, assas-
sinations, murders, etc. Obviously, political murders happened elsewhere in Europe 
as well and were not exclusive to the post-Ottoman world but here they happened on 
a greater scale than elsewhere. The list of only the most notorious political murders 
59 J. Bell, Peasants in Power. Aleksandr Stambolijski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 1899-
1923, Princeton 1997, p. 8. 
60 Б. Стеваноић, op. cit., p. 220-221.
61 K.H. Karpat, op. cit., p. 494.
62 Д. Стојановић, Уље на воду: Политика и друштво у модерној историји Србије (in:) Србија 1804-
2004, ed. Љ. Димић, Д. Стојановић, М. Јовановић, Београд 2005, p. 118.
63 D. Parusheva, ‘They are all Rotters! Political Culture and Political Caricature in South-Eastern Europe 
Late 19th and Early 20th century’, Études balkaniques XLIV, 2008, No 4, p. 40-41. Todorov is convin-
ced about traditional ‘apolitical’ character of the Bulgarian society. A. Toдopoв, op. cit., p. 69.
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reflected events unfolding in almost all Balkan states. Already Prince Miloš, striving to 
retain his leadership of the Serbs during the Takovo rising in 1815, ordered the killing 
of Kara Djordje, the initiator and hero of the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 who had 
in the meantime secretly arrived in the country. Djordje was captured and murdered 
and Prince Miloš sent his severed head to Sultan Mahmud II in Istanbul to gain his 
favor. This cruel act of degrading the victim was typical of the Balkans64. Following the 
years of revolt and vehement opposition to his rule, Prince Miloš was in turn forced to 
abdicate and leave the country in 1839. Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević ascended the 
throne in 1842 concurrently with the establishment of the regime of the ustavobran-
itelji but but he was forced to abdicate in 1858. Prince Miloš returned to the throne but 
for a short period. In 1860, he was succeeded by his son Prince Mihailo who had inher-
ited his father’s absolutist approach and became a despotic ruler hated even more than 
his father had been. He was shot dead in Belgrade in 1868 during a carriage ride in the 
park. The assassins were never identified65. His successor Prince and later King Milan, 
‘the worse among all despots’ according to a British observer66, was forced to abdicate 
and his son Prince Aleksandar Obrenović was murdered together with his wife Draga 
during the famous palace coup in May 1903. This murder resulted in a major political 
shift: the Karadjordjević dynasty came to power. They remained in power until the fall 
of the monarchy in Yugoslavia. King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević was murdered in 
1934 by Croatian separatists during his visit to Marseilles67. In August 1860, Prince 
Danilo I Petrović, the first lay ruler of Montenegro, was assassinated in Kotor, then in 
Austro-Hungary, by a political émigré and Montenegro tribesman motivated by Prince 
Danilo’s increasingly despotic rule, arrogance, and brutality68.
The most important political murder in Bulgaria was that of Stefan Stambolov, a 
politician who had played a seminal role in the forming of modern Bulgaria after it 
had attained independent statehood in 1878. His ruthless rule aimed at accelerating 
the processes of modernization won him many political enemies, most importantly 
Prince Ferdinand I of Bulgaria. Stambolov’s spectacular death, after he had already 
stepped down as prime minister, had all marks of an act of insidious vengeance. He 
was viciously assaulted in a street in Sofia on a carriage ride: the attackers used sabers 
to cut off his hands and slash his head open. To many a contemporary observer, the 
murder looked like Prince Ferdinand’s vendetta69. Shortly before his death, Stambolov 
had pointed to Prince Ferdinand as ‘his moral killer’, responsible for destroying his 
64 С. К. Павловић, Србија. Историја иза имена, Београд 2004, p .45.
65 F. Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples, Cambridge 1999, p. 95-96.
66 V. Chirol sir, Serbia and Serbs, Oxford 1914, p. 7.
67 M. Екмечић, Дуго кретанње између клања и орања. Исорија Срба у новом веку (1492-1992), Нови 
Сад 2011, p. 199-200.
68 E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 229; G.G. Arnakis, op. cit., p. 254.
69 Д. Иванов, Лидерът Стамболов, София 2014, p. 109.
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reputation in the eyes of the Bulgarian elite70. Aleksandyr Stamboliyski was another 
Bulgarian prime minister to meet a violent and degrading death. He was appointed 
prime minister in 1919 and his Agrarian Union won a majority in the national elec-
tion. Stamboliyski’s ruthless rule, by many regarded as dictatorial, and the draconian 
methods he resorted to trying to overcome the deep crisis following Bulgaria’s defeat 
in World War I antagonized the military and the middle class. His regime was re-
ferred to as ‘orange bolshevism’ from the emblematic color of the peasant party71. He 
was ousted in a military coup in 1923 and then brutally murdered72. His persecutors 
from the military tracked him down in his native village and had him dig out his own 
grave before killing him. His severed head was sent to Sofia in a box of biscuits73. This 
mode of decapitation – severing the head (mind) from the body – was a refined way 
of not only killing the enemy but also of degrading him and it was doubtlessly rooted 
in the Ottoman tradition74. In 1831, Ioannis Kapodistrias was murdered by the Ma-
vromichalis in retaliation for the arrest of Petrobey Mavromichalisa, the bey of the 
Mani Peninsula, who had been appointed by the Ottoman authorities.75 King George 
I of Greece was assassinated by an anarchist in Thessalonica in 1913. In 1928, Stjepan 
Radić, the leader of the Croatian People’s Peasant Party and a vehement opponent to 
the first Yugoslavia, was shot in the parliament by a radical Serbian politician. Radić 
later succumbed to his wound. In this context, the much more recent assassination of 
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić has to be mentioned. He was murdered by a 
confederacy of policemen and criminals in 200376. These are but selected examples of 
individual terror which was commonly and often with excessive cruelty waged against 
authorities in the Balkans.
Another important phenomenon was the so-called contracted violence, the term 
referring in this context to various irregular detachments operating in the Balkans 
which were commissioned to achieve certain political goals of their patrons. From the 
15th century, the Ottomans paid gangs of outlaws to substitute for Ottoman regular 
troops in the task of controlling the local population and other armed groups. The 
hajduks, a class of people whose origin and social background have been the stuff of 
legend and subject to many interpretations, were initially hired to extinguish local 
rebellions. In the 17th century, the growing brigandage in the Balkans persuaded the 
70 Д. Петков, Страници из спомените ми за Стамболова (in:) Стефан Стамболов като 
револуцционер, общественик и државник, София 1921, p. 125.
71 P. S. Tzvetkov, A History of the Balkans. A regional overview from a Bulgarian Perspective, San Francis-
co 1993, p. 102.
72 R. Daskalov, Debating the Past Modern Bulgarian History: From Stambolov to Živkov, New York-Bu-
dapest 2011, p. 123.
73 R. J. Crampton, Aleksnadŭr Stambolijski, London 2009, p. 113.
74 T. Stojanović, Balkanski svetovi. Prva i poslednja Evropa, Beograd 1997, p. 82.
75 L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, London 2002, p. 291.
76 D. Pavićević, ‘Memory, Trust and Fear in Post-Conflict Societas’, Southeastern Europe, 37 (2013), p. 
182.
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Ottoman authorities to commission the hajduks as mercenaries to provide a level of se-
curity to enable administrative and economic activity77. The historic role of the hajduks 
as Ottoman hirelings was soon forgotten and, from the 18th century, in the Balkan 
folkloric tradition, a hajduk became a romanticized heroic figure defying unjust laws 
and fighting against the Ottoman (and Habsburg) authorities for the people’s political 
and religious freedom78. In Balkan mythology, he became a guerilla, a paragon of cour-
age and a symbol of relentless fight against the Ottomans79. However, Vuk Karadžić, 
an acute observer of Serbian life, points to the criminal character of the hajduks’ activ-
ity: robbing merchants, kidnappings for ransom80.
The armatoloi were the Greek and Greek-Wallachian irregular soldiers commis-
sioned by the Ottomans to control areas in Greece which were difficult to govern be-
cause of their remoteness, inaccessible terrain or high levels of brigandage81. To the 
armatoloi violence became a way of life and a hereditary profession82. The most famous 
among irregular troops commissioned by the Ottomans were the bashi-bazouks, usu-
ally Circassians soldiers which were often dispatched as the avant-garde of Ottoman 
regular units in charge of putting off rebellions and insurgencies in the Balkans. The 
name Circassians was then used generally, in reference to all the Islamic peoples of the 
North Caucasus (the Cherkess, Abkhazians, Dagestani, and Chechens) expelled after 
the Russian conquest in the 1850s and 1860s. Altogether, about 400 thousand Circas-
sians were resettled to the Balkans83. They were commissioned to quench rebellions of 
the Christian population of the Balkans and often became common brigands. 
The practice of resorting to hired violence continued in the Balkans as a part of 
the Ottoman legacy and became quite common in the Balkan states. Mercenary units 
were commissioned by Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia fighting for territories in Macedo-
nia in the late 19th and early 20th century. The Greek andarts, Bulgarian komits and 
Serbian Chetniks84 fought the Turkish army and gendarmerie and turned against one 
another to gain control over local populations and territories as a preliminary step be-
fore their prospective incorporation into respective nations. The practice of delegating 
the execution of law to local armed groups exercising control by violent means became a 
77 J. Gledhill, C. King, Institutions Violence and Captive States in Balkan History (in:) Ottomans into 
Europeans. State and Institution Building in South-East Europe, ed. A. Mungi-Pippidi, W. van Meurs, 
London 2010, p. 251-252.
78 W.S. Vucinich, The First Serbian Uprising 1804-1813, New York 1982, p. 365-367.
79 K. Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats. The Ottoman Route to State Centralization, London 1997, p. 178.
80 В. Карађић, Етнографски списи, Београд 1972, p. 337-338.
81 Odysseus [C. Eliot], Turkey in Europe, London 1900, p. 77. T. Stojanović, Balkanski svetovi, p. 382-
383. T. Stoianovich, A Study in Balkan Civilization, New York 1967, p. 142-143.
82 K. Young, The Greek Passion. A Study in People and Politics, London 1969, p. 129.
83 M. Pinson, ‘Ottoman Colonization of the Circassians in Rumeli after the Crimean War’, Études bal-
kaniques 1972, No. 3, p. 75. И. Хаджийски, Моралната карта на България, София 2008, p. 172.
84 The Chetnik movement was supervised by the Serbian Foreign Ministry. Документи о спољној 
политици Краљевине Србије 1903-1914, Кнј. II, Организацја Српска одбрана 1906. године. Из 
фонда Архива Србије, Љ. Алексић-Пејковић, Ж. Анић ed. Beograd 2007, p. 11-12.
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post-Ottoman legacy85. The never-ending fighting of guerilla units with the Ottomans 
and among themselves resulted in a war of all against all. The respective governments 
became directly or indirectly involved in supporting the Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek 
hirelings fighting in Macedonia as a way of attaining nationalistic goals86. Researchers 
studying the problem of contracted violence generally agree that resorting to it in the 
process of nation building was part of the Ottoman tradition adopted in the Balkan 
states87. 
The centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans created the specific model of the cul-
ture of power strongly affecting the elites, political leaders and societies of the Balkan 
states in the 19th and 20th century. Except for the somewhat grotesque case of Prince 
Miloš, it did not happen through the straightforward copying of the Ottoman model. 
The forming of the independent Balkan states: Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, was as-
sisted by the great European powers whose non-discriminatory political systems and 
culture of power, resulting from a different legacy and civilizational background as 
well as the process of political modernization, provided attractive alternative models. 
Absorbed to a varying degree by the individual Balkan states, the Ottoman tradition 
comprised both a positive and a negative legacy. The free status of the peasantry, which 
under the Ottomans had been spared the second serfdom or other form of feudal or 
neo-feudal subservience and later retained its position, was certainly a positive legacy. 
The peasants became the core of the Balkan societies whose structure was quite uni-
form rather than diverse. On one hand, the new state elites were generally disdainful 
towards the peasantry, except for Serbia where the Radical Party of Nikola Pašić hailed 
them and the ‘proper’ nation. On the other hand, the peasants treated their respective 
national states as hostile and alien. The most prominent aspect of the Ottoman legacy 
as a culture of power was the sequence of authoritarian regimes in all respective states, 
from Prince Miloš to King Milan in Serbia, from Stefan Stambolov to Tsar Boris in 
Bulgaria, King Nicolas I Petrović’s long reign in Montenegro, and authoritarian re-
gimes of Ioannis Kapodistrias, King Othon I and the dictatorships in Greece.
The political life of the Balkan states was poisoned with the tradition of violence of-
ten marked with excessive cruelty, a legacy which became a part of the local reality and 
continued to haunt the Balkans through the end of the 20th century. Another Otto-
man tradition concerned with the position of bureaucracy and its destructive influence 
continued in the Balkan states. It was manifested in the adoption and reinforcement of 
the system of bribes that paralyzed any constructive initiative in public life.
85 J. Gledhill, C. King, op. cit., p. 250.
86 I. Stawowy-Kawka, Macedonia w polityce państw bałkańskich w XX wieku, Kraków 1993, passim.
87 Ottomans into Europeans. State and Institution Building in South-East Europe, ed. A. Mungi-Pippidi, 
W. van Meurs (introduction), p. XII. T. Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics. From Independent to 
Democracy, London 1997, p. 28.
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The question is whether the Ottomans had destroyed the ‘prosperous’ Balkan states 
or such ‘prosperous’ Balkan states had not existed. This question is doubtlessly relevant 
in the context of the development of the new Balkan states: to what degree did the 
Ottoman heritage influence the character of power in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece and 
how important was the local culture component? This question is particularly difficult 
with regard to Bulgaria. Najden Shejtanov emphasizes that the Bulgarians had not had 
their own state for seven hundred years and thus the influence of the Ottoman heritage 
upon their model of power was presumably especially significant88.
At the same time, it must be taken into account that the Ottoman Empire itself 
evolved over the centuries and consequently also with regard to the culture of power it 
did not provide an unchanging, uniform model89. Turkish scholars question the nega-
tive image of the Ottoman state first presented by Leopold von Ranke to whom the 
Ottomans were ‘nothing more than a destructive force outside the bounds of civiliza-
tion’90. Halil İnalcık argues that for centuries the Ottoman Empire exerted an influ-
ence upon many areas of Europe, Asia and Northern Africa but ‘in regions such the 
Balkans and the Middle East the impact was direct and decisive’. At the same time, he 
wonders: ‘can the historians maintain that a political system which lasted so long as did 
the Ottoman Empire was based on dysfunctional institutions?’91.
In the Balkans, the Ottoman tradition as the model of the culture of power com-
prised various forms and actions of central and local government whose power over 
the people was based on the authority of the state which, albeit national, was often 
perceived as no less oppressive than the Ottoman Empire, still imprinted in the collec-
tive memory, had been. In the minds of the peoples in the Balkans, the inadequacies of 
the culture of power in their respective national states made them perceive themselves 
not as Europeans but as a cultural hybrid between Europe and the Orient. 
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Sažetak
Osmanska tradicija kao model kulture moći na Balkanu u 19. i 20. stoljeću
Ovaj članak govori o utjecaju osmanske tradicije na balkanske države u 19. i 20. stoljeću. Poli-
tičko vodstvo i centraliziranu vlast na Balkanu karakterizirali su despotizam, autokracija i au-
toritarizam. Do takvog je stanja došlo zbog nedostatka demokratske tradicije te zbog premalo 
razvijene političke svijesti i kulture. Turski se sustav od europskog bitno razlikovao po položaju 
seljaka, koji su u Osmanskom Carstvu bili gotovo slobodni. Na Balkanu su se dugo, sve do kraja 
20. stoljeća, održala neka obilježja osmanske tradicije, kao što su nasilje, korupcija i nepotizam 
kao neizbježne sastojnice političkog života i moći koja je često prelazila iz ruke u ruku upravo 
kao posljedica nasilja, ubojstava itd.
Ključne riječi: Osmanlije, balkanske države, politička kultura, politički režim, nasilje, biro-
kracija, korupcija, društveni i gospodarski poredak
